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THE LOGIC OF CONSPIRACY-United States v. Spock, 416
F.2d 165 (1969). The Court of Appeals of the First Circuit in
United States v. Spock reversed the conspiracy convictions of the
four defendants-Dr. Benjamin Spock, Rev. William Sloane Cof-
fin, Mitchell Goodman, and Michael Ferber-for aiding and abet-
ting registrants to evade the military draft. However, Goodman
and Coffin were remanded to the district court for a new trial.
The decision is the most recent delineation of the elements requisite
to a conspiracy. These elements provide the outer limits for a
doctrine, the history of which exemplifies the "tendency of a prin-
ciple to expand itself to the limits of its logic."' It is the purpose
of this note to consider the doctrine of conspiracy, to delineate the
approach adopted by the court in United States v. Spock, and to
ask if the court's interpretation exceeded the limits of the logic of
conspiracy.
I. LoGIc OF CONSPIRACY
A definition of conspiracy is helpful in orienting a discussion
of the doctrine. Perkins has formulated the broadest definition:
"[a] conspiracy is a combination for an unlawful purpose.'' 2 Be-
yond an introduction, definitions lose their value, because the ele-
ments of a conspiracy vary with the logic supporting them. Since
the elements compose the concept being defined, it is inappro-
priate to begin with a restrictive definition.
The traditional assumption underlying conspiracy prosecution is
that there is an increased danger to society in collective action:
3
the possibility of abandonment of the scheme is reduced by re-
liance on the cooperation of coconspirators, its execution is more
likely to succeed with ready replacements, and the magnitude of
I B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921). This
phrase was applied to the doctrine of conspiracy by Justice Jackson in a
concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949).
2 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 529 (1957) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS].
The most common judicial definition appears in Pettibone v. United States,
148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893):
A conspiracy is sufficiently described as a combination of two or
more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or un-
lawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful,
by criminal or unlawful means . . . .
Perkins, finding the phrasing repetitious, produced the more terse defini-
tion. Holmes' reference to conspiracy as a "partnership in criminal pur-
poses," Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946), is often adopted
in popular discussion. See, e.g., Orton v. United States, 221 F. 2d 632, 633
(4th Cir. 1955).
3 Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV.
923- (1959). The authors refer to the "specified object" rationale which
focuses on the objects specifically contemplated by the conspiracy, and the
"general danger" rationale which looks to the dangers inherent in the
grouping. Id. at 925. The latter is more relevant to the underlying logic




the potential harm may be proportional to the number of persons
involved.4 Once effectively organized, the grouping may serve as
a focus for further unlawful activity. 5 Since the unlawful combi-
nation is seen as posing greater danger to society than individual
criminal conduct, its members are subjected to punishment for
collective involvement rather than specific action."
The logic of conspiracy varies with the nature of the elements
on which the concept is based. When the additional danger to
society of collective action is considered the underlying rationale
for prosecuting individuals as a conspiracy, 7 two elements form the
basis of the conspiracy-(a) relationship among individuals suffi-
cient to produce collective action, and (b) an unlawful purpose,
such that the dimension added is danger.8
The continuum of possible interpretations of conspiracy moves
from the broadest formulation of the requisite elements, applicable
to all instances of alleged conspiracy, to a narrower concept of
conspiracy which distinguishes instances in which first amend-
ment rights are involved:
Form a. Any agreement, for the full range of unlawful
purposes, is a relationship sufficient to present the added
danger of collective action.
4 R. PERKINS 535. See also People v. Comstock, 147 Cal. App. 2d 287,
305 P.2d 228 (1956); Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
5 Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 925. See also United States v.
Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915). As Judge Coffin summarized in his
dissent to United States v. Spock:
IT]he core idea underlying the conspiracy theory is that disciplined,
concerted action poses a greater threat to society than does individual
or uncoordinated group effort in that larger numbers permit a di-
vision of labor, and discipline makes withdrawal from the enterprise
less likely.
416 F.2d at 184.
6 R. PERKINS 535. Perkins discusses some instances where unlawful
combinations do not have any element of added danger, i.e., when the
substantive offense requires concerted action and none participate but the
necessary parties.
7 Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 983. The author adds that
in practical rather than logical terms, the rationale behind conspiracy may
be solely the evidentiary and jurisdictional advantages. The more appealing
of these advantages were listed in Tea-party Theory of Conspiracy, 44
MARQ. L. REV. 73 (1960): (1) quantum of proof frequently less; (2) stat-
ute of limitations for the substantive offense extended by charge of con-
tinuing conspiracy; and (3) coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
While this practical rationale must be recognized, it is a result of the rules
which have developed governing conspiracy prosecution rather than part of
the logic of the doctrine itself.
8 A third element, individual adherence to the illegality, is discussed
in Spock, 416 F.2d at 176-80. Analytically, this element, rather than being
essential to the creation of the conspiracy, is used as a check to assure that
each member of a group is committed to the unlawful purpose posited as
element b. That added element is especially crucial when the organization




Form b. Any combination, for the full range of unlawful
purposes, is a relationship sufficient to present the added
danger of collective action.
Form c. Any combination, for the full range of unlawful
purposes, is a relationship sufficient to present the added
danger of collective action; but members of a combina-
tion who submit their opposition to current definitions of
unlawful conduct to the marketplace of ideas may reduce
their potential for added danger. To the extent that the
potential is decreased, a less restrictive alternative should
be employed.
Form d. Any combination, for the full range of unlawful
purposes, other than those which submit their opposition
to current definitions of unlawful conduct to the market-
place of ideas, results in added danger to society.
This continuum is not intended to exhaust the possible formula-
tions applicable to conspiracy. Nor does it offer any judgment as
to which of the formulations is preferable. It does, however, outline
distinctions which are relevant and underline the problems which
any court considering a conspiracy charge must resolve.
The threshold requirement for a conspiracy is the relationship
among members of the alleged conspiracy. If a relationship suffi-
cient to cross this threshold is not established, no conspiracy exists.
Form a refers to this relationship as a'n agreement, form b as a
combination. The distinction is more than one of semantics; it is a
matter of logical sufficiency. Agreement has a broad scope which
can reach from parallel responses in thought or action to a common
concern, through a shifting cluster of individuals sharing some ideas,
to a cohesive organization with explicit goals. The unity of idea or
purpose, the meeting of the minds in contract terms, is necessary
to a conspiracy. Proponents of form a would find this unity suffi-
cient to constitute a conspiracy as well.10
Proponents of form b, while admitting that an agreement com-
prises a necessary condition, find only an actual combination suffi-
cient to yield a conspiracy. 1 A combination, in contrast, is the
product of an agreement, and connotes an intent to come together
9 A necessary condition is a condition which must be met, but which
may not, of itself, produce the result. A sufficient condition, when met,
produces the result.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940):
The gist of the offense of conspiracy as defined by sec. 37 of the
Criminal Code, 18 USCA §' 88, is agreement among the conspirators
to commit an offense attended by an act of one or more of the
conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy.
11 R. PERKINs 530. Perkins, who supports the proposition that the
conspiracy is the resulting combination, still sees a meeting of the minds,
i.e., a unity of design and purpose, as necessary to the conspiracy. See
also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447-8 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); People v. Campbell, 132 Cal. App. 2d 262, 281 P.2d 912 (1955).
NoT_ s
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regarding the subject of agreement, whether or not action follows. 1 2
Since a combination is the result of the agreement," the agree-
ment still is necessary. The sufficiency of agreement, therefore,
is the issue which distinguishes forms a and b.
Both approaches are found in court decisions, though judges fre-
quently are unclear in their opinions which formulation they are
adopting. The practical effect of the distinction is reflected in the
type and amount of proof required. As a minimum, parallelism of
thought or reaction is sufficient to establish agreement. A com-
bining, or coming together in idea or act, negates any reliance on
parallelism and forces the prosecution into an area infinitely more
difficult of proof.
1 4
The distinction between agreement and combination turns on a
question of logical sufficiency. The emphasis of forms c and d, or
the effect of using first amendment rights to submit opposition to
definitions of unlawful conduct to the marketplace of ideas, is
rather a matter of emotional or political orientation. These forms
involve the extent to which one sees society threatened or en-
dangered by certain conduct or expression.'5 The range of ju-
dicial response runs from consistent application of form a or form
b without reference to these added variables, through a feeling
that such variables may reduce potential danger and thus call for
extra protection, to an assertion that the involvement of first amend-
ment dissent per se negates added danger and compels the highest
protection.
Once beyond the point where it is recognized that cases involving
first amendment rights of speech and association used to oppose
definitions of unlawful conduct are distinguishable, the line is
clearly drawn between those who will recognize that these cases
12 See Fraina v. United States, 255 F. 28 (2d Cir. 1918): "The essence
of a conspiracy is the combination, and the act of combining should
ordinarily be first made to appear, before proving the acts and declarations
of the co-conspirators." Id. at 34.
13 Perkins explains most succinctly:
Since the conspiracy is the combination resulting from the agreement,
rather than the mere agreement itself it follows that the verb con-
spire where used in law, has reference to the formation of the combi-
nation. "To conspire" means "to combine" and not merely "to
agree."
PERKINS 530. The agreement alone is insufficient: "The essence of the
crime is the unlawful combination." Id. at 565.
14 It is precisely this difficulty of proof which has given rise to
special rules of evidence which allow a freer use of inference and circum-
stance. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
"The evidence of conspiracy is largely circumstantial, but ... the
nature of a conspiracy is such that it can rarely be proved any other way."
White v. United States, 394 F.2d 49, 51 (1968).
15 This danger or threat is the second of the two elements discussed




may deserve a higher standard of protection, and those who find
such protection compelled. Proponents of a less restrictive alter-
native usually will recognize that openness of dissent towards
definitions of crime reduces the threat of a conspiracy to society,
because the dissent can be countered by the government's argu-
ments, and the occurrence of the substantive crime can be closely
anticipated.' 6 Advocates of this position require application of the
least restrictive alternative only to the extent that the potential
danger is reduced. Individual prosecution for the substantive of-
fense is the most obvious less restrictive alternative, for it does not
inhibit collective implementation of first amendment rights of
speech and assembly. Though an infringement of rights of speech
and assembly may appear in the prosecution of a single person for
the substantive offense, the direct burden is limited to the accused.
If members of a group identify closely with the individual prose-
cuted, the indirect infringement on rights of speech and assembly
may be as great as the effect of a conspiracy prosecution.
Form d recognizes that the implementation of overt association
and public expression within the first amendment guarantee may
well be the preferred basis of a democratic society. As depicted
in Wallace Mendelson's analysis,
Democracy, then, is the unfettered exchange of ideas with
public control of action in accordance with those thoughts
which win acceptance in the marketplace of reason.' 7
This conclusion may be based on the belief that such an exchange
is the best test of truth. Mr. Justice Holmes expressed that faith.
But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.
1 8
The Supreme Court of the United States recently reiterated this
value in New York Times v. Sullivan when it pronounced a "pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. ... 9
16 See U.S. v. Robe, 389 U.S. 258, 265-68 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-14 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89
(1960); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 457 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
17 W. MENDELSON, JusTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE
COURT 52 (2d ed. 1966).
18 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes &
Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
19 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Although the suit was for libel, the case
involved political criticism and may, therefore, be analogous to a conspiracy
prosecution for acts or words of dissent.
NOTES
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As a basis of democracy and a test of truth, the implementation
of freedom of expression offers society an added value, early recog-
nized by Cato:
Without freedom of thought there can be no such thing
as wisdom; and no such thing as publick (sic) liberty, with-
out freedom of speech .... 20
Finding an added value to society in such a conspiracy, rather than
an added danger, the reason for applying the doctrine of con-
spiracy is not present and first amendment protection is compelled.21
The continuum of formulations provides a framework for an
analysis of the opinion in Spock and an opportunity to determine
whether the logic adopted by the court prohibited it from consider-
ing the relevant elements of the alleged conspiracy.
II. UNITED STATES V. SPOCK: THE DECISION
Benjamin Spock, Michael Ferber, Mitchell Goodman, and Wil-
liam Sloane Coffin were convicted under a single indictment for
conspiracy in violation of the Military Selective Service Act of
196722 and sentenced to two years imprisonment with varying
fines. In essence it was charged that they conspired to "counsel,
aid and abet" young men to avoid the military draft.
The basis of their actions was opposition to United States involve-
ment in the war in Vietnam. The chronology of their individual
actions encompassed the drafting and signing of the Call to Resist
Illegitimate Authority,23 the press conference publicizing the Call,24
20 Cato, Letters, quoted in M. SUMMERS, FREE SPEECH AND POLITICAL
PROTEST vii (1967).
21 Judge Coffin in his dissent in Spock, 416 F.2d at 185, is tempted to
agree, but refuses:
One is tempted to say the law should recognize no overt conspiracy
in the sensitive area of public discussion and opinion. But this
would be to go too far. Were this so, "going public" would confer an
immunity on both nefarious joint undertakings and an absolute
protection to criminal enterprise not vouchsafed by the First
Amendment even for individual speech.
22 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50-Appendix U.S.C. § 462(a)
(Supp. IV, 1969):
Any person ... who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another
to refuse or evade registration or service in the armed forces or any
of the requirements of this title [said sections], or of said rules,
regulations or directions .. . or who conspires to commit any one
or more of such offenses, shall, upon conviction in any district court
of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more
than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment ....
2. 416 F.2d at 168. Spock participated in drawing up A Call to Resist
Illegitimate Authority, and a cover letter requesting signatures, funds, and
a commitment of personal effort to ending the war in Vietnam. Coffin and
Spock signed the cover letter and were among the original signers of the
Call, which later was signed by Goodman and several hundred others. A
copy of the Call appears in the appendix to the opinion in Spock, 416
[VOL. 1970:162
NUMBER 1]
the surrender and burning of draft cards at Arlington Street
Church in Boston,25 the October 20th antiwar demonstration in
Washington, 26 and a march and sit-in at the Whitehall Induction
Center in New York.
27
The opinion expresses a pervasive concern with attempting to
make the evil separable from the good in an organization with
mixed legal and illegal aims, without inhibiting legitimate organiza-
tion in an orderly society.
28
In positing the importance of the first amendment rights of free
speech and free association, 29 the court focuses on the nature of the
larger grouping from which the four defendants were drawn:
This intertwining of legal and illegal aspects, the public
setting of the agreement and its political purposes, and
the loose confederation of possibly innocent and possibly
F.2d at 192. It was addressed "To the young men of America, to the
whole of the American people, and to men of good will everywhere." It
denominated the American war in Vietnam as immoral, unconstitutional,
illegal, and violative of international agreements, treaties, and principles
of law endorsed by the United States. It also challenged denial of exemp-
tion to men whose religious or philosophical beliefs led them to oppose the
war as an unconstitutional denial of both religious liberty and equal pro-
tection of the laws. On the belief "that every freeman has a legal right
and a moral duty to exert every effort to end this war, to avoid collusion
with it, and to encourage others to do the same," the signers found the forms
of resistance listed (in a form including or suggesting illegal resistance)
courageous and justified, and offered their active support.
24 Id. at 177. On October 2, 1967, a press conference was held to
publicize the Call. Coffin, Goodman and Spock released statements con-
sistent with the Call. Goodman advanced his own document, Civil Dis-
obedience, which gave as its purpose, "[t]o take away from the govern-
ment the support and bodies it needs." Coffin was one of the signers of
Civil Disobedience.
25 Id. at 168, 178. On October 16 a draft card burning and surrender
took place at the Arlington Street Church in Boston. It was arranged in
part by Ferber. Coffin participated in receiving the draft cards.
26 Id. at 177. On October 20 the four defendants attended an anti-
war demonstration in Washington, organized by Goodman and Coffin,
where they attempted to turn over their collection of draft cards to the
Attorney General. At the Washington demonstration Goodman stated the
desire of the older generation to form an alliance with young men which
"we will persist in, at least as long as the war lasts, in which we will
encourage them and aid and abet and counsel them in every way we
know how." At the same demonstration Coffin likewise referred to and
approved a joint undertaking: "We hereby publicly counsel these
young men to continue in their refusal to serve in the armed forces as
long as the war in Vietnam continues, and we pledge ourselves to aid
and abet them in all the ways we can." Spock spoke, warning against
division in the ranks of the resisters.
27 On December 5 Spock and Goodman participated in a march and
sit-in at the Whitehall Induction Center. Both were arrested. The court
did not mention, and apparently did not rely on, the events at the Whitehall
Induction Center. The event was cited in the briefs of both sides.
28 416 F.2d at 173.
-,9 Id. at 169, 170.
NOTES
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guilty participants raise the most serious First Amendment
problems.80
The solution adopted by the court is the addition of a third element,
specific individual intent, to the two traditionally required ele-
ments of a conspiracy, i.e., agreement and illegal purpose.3 1
In finding an agreement, the court cited the evidence regarding
the Call, the cover letter, and the press conference-the factual
basis of the government's claim of agreement. Concluding that
the evidence disclosed more than parallel conduct, the court found
the jury justified in inferring an agreement from these instances
of concerted activity.3
2
For evidence of illegal purpose the court looked solely to the
Call, and "its own clues as to what its subscribers may have in-
tended the words to mean. '33 It held that the jury was justified
in finding a "call to unlawful refusal, '34 but was again troubled
by the dual purposes of the defendants' actions:
The Call had a "double aspect: in part it was a denunci-
ation of governmental policy and, in part, it involved a pub-
lic call to resist the duties imposed by the Act."35
Finally, the element added by the court, specific illegal intent of
each defendant, is discussed extensively. A standard for judging
the requisite intent is set-"strictissimi juris"36-to distinguish
those guilty of the crime of conspiracy from others in a group with
mixed legal and illegal aims. Specific illegal intent of each de-
fendant, the court found, may be manifested by: (1) prior or
subsequent unambiguous statements; (2) subsequent commission
of the illegal activities contemplated by the agreement; (3) subse-
quent legal act, if such act is "clearly undertaken for the specific
purpose of rendering effective the later illegal activity which is
advocated. 3 7 The factual inquiry was broad, looking beyond the
Call and press conference, which were the focus in finding the
agreement and unlawful purpose, to the complete list of antiwar ac-
30 Id. at 169.
81 The court commented:
Application of such a standard should forcefully answer the defend-
ant's protests that conviction of any of them would establish
criminal responsibility of all of the many hundreds of persons who
signed the Call. Even if the Call included illegal objectives, there
is a wide gap between signing a document such as the Call and
demonstrating one's personal attachment to illegality.
Id. at 173.
82 Id. at 175.
s8 Id. at 176.
84 Id.
35 Id., the court quoting from the Unitarian Universalist Association,
amicus on behalf of Ferber.
36 Id. at 172. Defined as: "[o]f the strictist right or law." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1591 (4th ed. 1951).
87 Id. at 173.
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tivities in which the defendants were involved.38
Applying the above tests, the court failed to find the requisite
specific illegal intent for Spock and Ferber.39 Coffin and Good-
man, however, were remanded for retrial on the prejudicial error
of the judge below in submitting specific questions to the jury.
40
III. UNITED STATES V. SPOCK: THE LOGIC
A court should be compelled by the logic it adopts to reach a
result consistent with that logic. If it fails to do so, the opinion
may yield a confusing precedent.
The majority in United States v. Spock ostensibly adopts the
logic of form c and recognizes that the involvement of first amend-
ment rights requires special protections. 41 Because of the im-
portance of first amendment rights they specifically approve the
application of a less restrictive alternative if there is one by which
the substantive evil can be prevented. 4 2  The logic of form d,
whereby open discussion yields a positive value to society rather
than a danger, was rejected.
43
The disposition of the individual cases is consistent with the
court's logic. Ferber and Spock were acquitted. Although the
cases of Goodman and Coffin were remanded for new trials, it does
not appear that they will be reprosecuted. 44 Careful analysis of the
opinion, however, indicates that the court reached its conclusion
by reasoning inconsistent with the logic it claimed:
(1) ' In indicating the appropriateness of a less restrictive alter-
native because of first amendment involvement, the court relied on
a weighing process. As Judge Coffin indicates in his dissent, how-
ever, its attention focused on only one side of the balance.
4
1 It
38 Id. at 176-79. For specific intent, the court looked to the Arlington
Street Church ceremony, the Washington demonstration and Goodman's
Civil Disobedience, as well as the Call and the press conference.
39 Id. at 179. Spock's actions supposedly lacked the clear character
necessary to imply specific intent. Ferber, although he made incidental use
of some of the other defendants' purposes, did not show a commitment to
all of them. The court found that while he might be guilty of a smaller
conspiracy, he should not be convicted for the larger one.
40 Id. at 180-83. The use of such questions was held to be a simple way
to force a verdict of guilty, by making guilt the logical result of the answers
given to the questions. The jury, as the conscience of the community, should
be permitted to make its decision independent of the logical compulsion
of the jury instructions.
41 Id. at 170.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 This was the opinion expressed by Leonard B. Boudin, attorney for
Dr. Spock, in a letter dated September 29, 1969. Marshall Tamor Golding,
attorney for the Department of Justice, gave no clear indication of plans
for retrial in this letter of September 26, 1969.
45 416 F.2d at 189.
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considered the nation's interest in raising an army; the right of the
government, because of the potency of conspiratorial conduct, not
to have to wait for the commission of the substantive offense; the
incitement of defendants' actions; and the fact that Congress has
authorized the crime of conspiracy as a sanction. There is no dis-
cussion of the efficacy of less restrictive alternatives.4 Nor were
specific aspects of first amendment involvement weighed. The
court concludes:
The First Amendment cases merely present a more diffi-
cult problem of insuring that the government does not use
its procedural advantages to expand the strict elements of
the offense.
47
(2) After finding that the government's interest in opposing a
less restrictive alternative was overwhelming, the court set out a
method of protecting first amendment rights when the conspiracy
doctrine is applied. However, their reasoning and their language
appear to yield a broader liability than is provided for a non-first
amendment conspiracy prosecution.
Rather than raising the threshold requirement of a combination,
for a conspiracy or at least an agreement, the court summarily
accepted the jury's finding of an agreement and turned to the
evidence of specific intent to ensure the culpability of the individual
members of the alleged conspiracy. The court presumed that an
agreement was sufficient to yield a conspiracy, 48 and then accepted
the jury's finding of an agreement from instances of allegedly con-
certed activity.
The Call was not what is known in law as an integrated
document, limited to the four corners of the instrument.
The jury could properly infer that it could not occur in the
abstract, with no parents, and no active participants in
a joint undertaking. We hold that they could look to Spock
as one of the drafters, and to Spock and Coffin as two of
the four signers of the solicitation letter, and in light of the
press conference held to publicize the Call in which Good-
man took a prominent part, they could find that Goodman
included himself as an active member.
49
Consequently, the court deprives "agreement" of much of its signifi-
cance in a case where the agreement or combination among the
46 Id. at 190 (Coffin, J., dissenting).
Nowhere does the court indicate why either approach (individual
or collective prosecution for the substantive crime) could not have
served the societal interest equally as well. If "less restrictive
alternative" is to have any real meaning courts should examine
with specificity the utility of the rifle before resort is had to the
shotgun.
Id.
4T Id. at 172.
48 See text accompanying notes 9-10, supra.
49 416 F.2d at 175.
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parties is crucial to the finding of a conspiracy. 50
Treating the agreement, even when established, as an insuffi-
cient predicate 51 is inconsistent with the emphasis in the law of
conspiracy upon the relationship among individuals. To look at
individual acts for specific intent does not focus on the conspiracy.
The Court listed certain facts which might be evidence of specific
intent: prior or subsequent unambiguous statements by defendant,
subsequent commission by defendant of the illegal act contemplated
by the agreement, or subsequent legal acts of defendant clearly
undertaken to make the later activity effective.5 2  The last two
refer to the agreement, but the concentration on specific intent
regarding the agreement weakens this essential aspect of con-
spiracy. The focus of the Spock court is on the individual rather
than the conspiracy; and the subsequent actions of the defendants,
and not the agreement, become crucial. The result is a form of
substantive offense prosecution 53 which carries penalties intended
for the additional danger caused by the collective action of a con-
spiracy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The underlying assumption of the doctrine of conspiracy, that in-
creased danger to society results from collective action, requires that
two elements form the offense- (a) relationship among indi-
viduals sufficient to produce collective action, and (b) an unlaw-
ful purpose which adds the dimension of increased danger. The
court in Spock presumed a sufficient agreement for a conspiracy
and granted that first amendment rights call for special protec-
tion. However, the court chose to protect the alleged conspirators
in circumstances involving first amendment rights by considering
the specific individual intent. If this were linked with sufficient
evidence of an agreement, then the result might have been con-
sistent. However, the derogation of the element of an agreement
places the individual in the position of being tried for a substantive
offense rather than the alleged crime of conspiracy. The doctrine
that emerges has, arguably, exceeded the limits of its logic, and has
increased the threat of conspiracy prosecution as a weapon to con-
trol political dissent.
54
50 Id. at 187 (Coffin, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 190 (Coffin, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 173.
53 Id. at 190 (Coffin, J., dissenting).
54 As Judge Coffin expressed in his dissent:
This is a landmark case and no one, I take it, supposes that this will
be the last attempt by the government to use the conspiracy weapon.
The government has cast a wide net and caught only two fish. My
objection is not that more were not caught but that the government
can try again on another day in another court and the court's ration-
ale provides no meaningful basis for predicting who will find them-
selves within the net. Finally there is the greater danger that the
casting of the net has scared away many whom the government
had no right to catch.
Id. at 191 (Coffin, J., dissenting).
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